Does risk attitude (aversion or attraction) vary with the level of the income at risk? About half of our subjects chose to insure all levels, whereas another half chose instead not to insure low levels, but to insure high levels.
Introduction
Our subjects were given a list of seven amounts of money, to be called Initial Experimental Incomes, or IEI's. They were asked whether or not they would insure them. We wanted to learn in what way the willingness to insure an IEI may depend on its amount. If we may identify the decision to insure with risk aversion, and the decision not to insure with risk attraction, then the question can be rephrased as: Does the risk attitude (aversion or attraction) on IEI vary with the IEI? To the extent that decisions regarding the insurance of experimental income reflect nonexperimental economic decisions on insuring income risks, our results cast light on the possible dependence of the attitude towards income risks on the level of the income at risk.
The experiment
We performed the experiment in a single session (no preliminary pilot sessions) using 21 undergraduates: we deliberately excluded any students in economics or business. Subjects were seated in visually-isolated booths in the LeeX lab at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra. They were told that they would receive at random one of the following amounts of money (or IEI's), denominated in the Spanish currency : 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 7500, 10000 or 15000 (i.e., from US$3.50 to US$ 103).
Once the IEI was assigned, there was a 20% chance of losing it, but subjects could buy an actuarially fair insurance against this loss 1 . Subjects were asked to decide, before knowing the IEI obtained, whether or not to insure each of the potential IEI's.
To record their decisions, subjects were given a 7-page folder, one page for each possible IEI.
Every page had five boxes arranged vertically. The IEI was printed in the first box, and the insurance premium in the second one, with the statement that the premium was exactly 20% of the IEI. The third box contained two check cells, one for insuring the IEI, and another one for not insuring it.
Below a separating horizontal line, two more boxes were later used to record first whether the IEI was lost and, and then the take-home amount. In order to facilitate decisions, a matrix on the back of the page showed all the payoffs. The information was given to the subjects as written instructions 1 We avoided extreme probabilities: 0.2 seems to be above the range that tends to be overweighed (Preston and Baratta, 1948) and below the range that tends to be underweighed (0.3 to 0.8 according to Cohen, Jaffray and Said, 1985) .
(available on request), which were read aloud by the experimenter. The experiment began after all questions were privately answered.
Once all subjects had registered their decisions (under no time constraint: nobody used more than 15 minutes), their pages were collected. Subjects were then called one by one to an office with an urn that initially contained 21 pieces of paper: each piece indicated one IEI, and each of the seven IEI's occurred three times. A piece of paper was randomly drawn (without replacement): the experimenter and the subject then checked in the folder whether she had insured that particular IEI. If she had, then the premium was subtracted from the IEI to obtain the take-home amount. If she had not, then a number from 1 to 5 was randomly chosen from another urn. If the number 1 was drawn, then the subject would lose the IEI, taking nothing home. Otherwise, she would take home the IEI.
The subject was then paid and dismissed, and the next subject was escorted into the office.
The following element of the experiment was not included in the written instructions. As described above, we asked subjects to consider several possible IEI's for the sake of obtaining a larger data set. This procedure tends to elicit the same choices as when subjects make only one choice (Starmer and Sugden, 1991 ), but we wanted to check this tendency. Consequently, we allowed each subject to reconsider her reported decision after her IEI was selected. Of the 21 subjects involved, only one, labeled G, changed his mind (from non-insurance to insurance, at the borderline between his previous noninsurance and insurance decisions). This observation seems insufficient to negate the overall reliability of hypothetical decisions as accurate descriptions of real choices, but it does exemplify a higher likelihood of risk aversion in played games (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990) .
Results
See Table 1 . Each row corresponds to the decisions to insure (y) or not to insure (n) the seven IEI's by each one of the 21 subjects, who are labeled A to U. For example, an "y" in column 2000, row A, means "subject A decides to insure the amount ω if ω is 2000". A capital letter indicates the IEI that the corresponding subject received. As explained, subject G, after he obtained the IEI of 5000 and was allowed to reconsider, did switch to insurance. Table 1 . Decisions taken by the 21 subjects to insure (y) or not to insure (n) the seven IEI's.
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Analysis
We claim that Table 1 supports the following assertion.
Fact I. In the aggregate, the decision to insure is positively correlated with the level of IEI.
Note, first, that all subjects insure the highest IEI (15000). Second, from Table 1 we can construct the following Table, Table 2 Third, consider a probit regression model with random intercept (to allow for dependency among observations of the same subject), specified as
(Φ denotes the cumulative normal N(0,1) distribution function, and π the probability of insuring)
where all the observations in the same row of Table 3 .
Looking now at each row of Table 1 , we find two well-represented patterns, and two infrequent ones.
Pattern 1: always yes. Subjects displaying this pattern buy fair insurance at any level of IEI.
This is the most frequent pattern, displayed by 10 subjects, or 47.6 % of the subject pool. 
Risk attitudes and the shape of the utility function
We shall identify risk aversion with the decision to insure IEI at a fair premium, and risk attraction with the decision not to insure. Strictly speaking, either insurance or noninsurance are compatible with risk neutrality, and we cannot rule out risk neutrality in our subjects, particularly in those who switch more than once (Patterns 3 and 4). But our presentation disregards the knife-edge case of risk neutrality because we think that, on average, it is unlikely. Indeed, under risk neutrality the subject should be indifferent between insuring or not, and, therefore, the YES or NO answers would basically be chance variations. Yet the likelihood that our complete sample consists of random variations is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Contrary to a long tradition in experimental economics, we made no attempt to test the expected utility theory, and we have nothing to contribute on this issue. But our results can be expressed in the language of the utility or value functions that appear in expected utility theory or some of its generalizations.
Write Ω ≡ {500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 7500, 10000, 15000}, the set of the seven possible IEI's. otherwise. Writing u i for the function that assigns u i (x) to x, x ∈ X, the first (resp. second) inequality is equivalent to the concavity (resp. convexity) of u i on the domain {0, 0.8 ω, ω}. Thus, a particular sequence of seven "y" or "n" can be reworded as a sequence of seven expressions "concavity on {0, 0.8 ω, ω}" or "convexity on {0, 0.8 ω, ω}".
These sequences can be naturally associated with the curvature patterns of a smooth function defined on a real interval. First, Pattern 1, which now corresponds to "concavity for all domains of the type {0, 0.8 ω, ω}," is naturally associated to a concave function, as in Figure But he also discusses potential discrepancies between "present wealth" and "customary wealth." "Present wealth" could certainly be translated here as the subject's nonexperimental wealth (same as "customary wealth"). But another interpretation is conceivable, where "present wealth" equals the sum of the subject's nonexperimental wealth and the IEI. If the take-home amount x deviates from the IEI ω (due either to the payment of the insurance premium or the loss of an uninsured ω), then the relevant argument in Markowitz's formulation is x -ω, a negative number, and the relevant half of the horizontal axis in his Figure 5 is the negative half, where we see risk aversion for small absolute values (low IEI), and risk attraction for large ones. This pattern has not been observed in our experiment. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, Figure 3 ) follow Markowitz in drawing the utility curve (called "value curve") in terms of deviations from a reference point: they posit concavity for positive deviations (gains) and convexity for negative ones (losses). Again, any harmony of their ideas with our experimental findings crucially depends on how we interpret their notion of a reference point, i.e., on what a gain or a loss is in the eyes of a subject. As in the previous paragraph, if the subject takes her nonexperimental wealth as reference, then she views any take-home amount of money x as a gain.
Alternatively, if she takes the nonexperimental wealth plus the IEI ω as reference, then she perceives x -ω as a loss.
We see no reason to favor one of the two interpretations in our context. Imagine a subject filling in her YES-NO answers, and contemplating the insurance of an IEI of 10000. Does she think:
if I insure, I will gain only 8000? Or, on the contrary, does she think: if I insure, I will lose 2000?
In any event, if the reference point is taken to be the subject's nonexperimental wealth, then the relevant half of the horizontal axis of Kahneman and Tversky's Figure 3 
